The Impact of Economic and Behavioral Drivers on Gig Economy Workers
The Fishman-Davidson Center supported Professor Gad Allon in conducting the research entitled “The Impact of Economic and Behavioral Drivers on Gig Economy Workers.”
Problem definition: Gig economy companies benefit from labor flexibility by hiring independent workers in response to real-time demand. However, workers’ flexibility in their work schedule poses a great challenge in terms of planning and committing to a service capacity. Understanding what motivates gig economy workers is thus of great importance. In collaboration with a ride-hailing platform, we study how on-demand workers make labor decisions; specifically, whether to work and work duration. Our model revisits competing theories of labor supply regarding the impact of financial incentives and behavioral motives on labor decisions. We are interested in both improving how to predict the behavior of flexible workers and understanding how to design better incentives.
Methodology/results: Using a large comprehensive data set, we develop an econometric model to analyze workers’ labor decisions and responses to incentives while accounting for sample selection and endogeneity. We find that financial incentives have a significant positive influence on the decision to work and on the work duration—confirming the positive income elasticity posited by the standard income effect. We also find support for a behavioral theory as workers exhibit income-targeting behavior (working less when reaching an income goal) and inertia (working more after working for a longer period).
Managerial implications: We demonstrate via numerical experiments that incentive optimization based on our insights can increase service capacity by 22% without incurring additional cost, or maintain the same capacity at a 30% lower cost. Ignoring behavioral factors could lead to understaffing by 10%–17% below the optimal capacity level. Lastly, our insights inform the design of platform strategy to manage flexible workers amidst an intensified competition among gig platforms.
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Illicit Behavior on Online Platforms: An Analysis of Sex Trafficking on the Dark Web
The Fishman-Davidson Center supported Professor Hamsa Bastani in conducting the research entitled “Illicit Behavior on Online Platforms: An Analysis of Sex Trafficking on the Dark Web.”
Inventory, Speculators and Initial Coin Offering
The Fishman-Davidson Center supported Professor Serguei Netessine in conducting the research entitled “Inventory, Speculators and Initial Coin Offering.”
Abstract: Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are an emerging form of fundraising for blockchain-based startups. We examine how ICOs can be leveraged in the context of asset tokenization, whereby firms issue tokens backed by future assets (i.e., inventory) to finance growth. We (i) make suggestions on how to design such “asset-backed” ICOs—including optimal token floating and pricing for both utility and equity tokens (a.k.a. security token offerings)—taking into account moral hazard (cash diversion), product characteristics, and customer demand uncertainty; (ii) make predictions on ICO success/failure; and (iii) discuss implications on firm operating strategy. We show that in unregulated environments, ICOs can lead to significant agency costs, underproduction, and loss of firm value. These inefficiencies, however, fade as product margins and demand characteristics (mean/variance) improve, and they are less severe under equity (rather than utility) token issuance. Importantly, the advantage of equity tokens stems from their inherent ability to better align incentives and thus continues to hold even absent regulation.
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The Spillover Effects of Capacity Pooling in Hospitals
The Fishman-Davidson Center supported Professor Hummy Song in conducting the research entitled “The Spillover Effects of Capacity Pooling in Hospitals.”
Abstract: Off-service placement is a common capacity-pooling strategy that hospitals utilize to address mismatches in supply and demand that arise from the day-to-day variation in patient demand. This strategy involves placing patients in a bed in a unit that is designated for another specialty service. Building on prior work that documents the negative first order effects of off-service placement on patients who are placed off service themselves, we quantify the spillover effects of this practice on patients who are actually placed on service. Using an estimation strategy that combines the Heckman correction procedure and a heteroskedasticity-based identification approach, we find that off-service placement has substantial negative spillover effects on the efficiency of care delivered to on-service patients. In particular, we find that a 10 percentage point increase in the level of off-service placement during a patient’s hospitalization is associated with a 10.9% increase in length of stay. Through a series of counterfactual analyses, we propose alternate routing and capacity-planning policies that could meaningfully improve the efficiency of care in the inpatient setting.
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Relating Practices of Productivity: Is Big Ag "Evil"?
The Fishman-Davidson Center supported Professor Marshall Fisher in conducting the research entitled “Relating Practices of Productivity: Is Big Ag ‘Evil’?.”
Empirical Studies of the Gig Economy Workforce
The Fishman-Davidson Center supported Professor Ken Moon in conducting the research entitled “Empirical Studies of the Gig Economy Workforce.”